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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, English and Irish Law were both distinctly protective of marriage (still understood as 
an exclusively heterosexual institution)
1
 as compared to other forms of adult relationship.  In the 
1950 English case of Gammans v. Ekins, it was famously deemed an “abuse of the English 
language” to say that an unmarried couple “masquerading” as husband and wife were members of 
the same family.
2
  In its Constitution, meanwhile, the Irish state “pledges itself to guard with special 
care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack”.3  
The powerfulness of this “pledge” can be seen from the fact that divorce was not possible in Ireland 
until a 1995 referendum resulted in a constitutional amendment.
4
 
Both jurisdictions have nevertheless responded to social conditions and recognised a broader 
range of relationships for certain purposes.  But in spite of their overlapping culture and 
geographical proximity, the recognition of adult relationships outside heterosexual marriage is 
proceeding at different rates in England and Wales on the one hand and in Ireland on the other.  In 
England and Wales, legislation was passed in 1995
5
 specifically to facilitate claims by unmarried 
cohabitants on their partners’ estates.  It took until July 2010 for the Republic of Ireland to enact 
such legislation,
6
 which also introduced a marriage-like
7
 registration scheme for same-sex couples
8
 
                                                          
*
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1
 Wilkinson v. Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295; Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue 
Commissioners [2006] IEHC 404, [2008] 2 I.R. 417 (the outcome of an appeal to the Irish Supreme Court is awaited).  
The Irish Coalition Government has pledged to set up a “Constitutional Convention” to consider same-sex marriage 
inter alia: Coalition Government of Ireland, “Government for National Recovery 2011-16” (Dublin 2011), p. 18. 
2
 [1950] 2 K.B. 328, 331 per Asquith L.J. 
3
 Constitution of Ireland, Article 41.3.1. 
4
 Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1995.  See now Constitution of Ireland, Article 41.3.2. 
5
 Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995, amending the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 
“1975 Act”). 
6
 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”), s. 194.  
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several years after the United Kingdom did so.
9
  That said, the Irish Civil Partnership and Certain 
Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) in addition provides an “opt-out” 
statutory scheme for the inter vivos redistribution of unmarried
10
 couples’ property.11  By contrast, 
and in spite of the efforts of the Law Commission and others,
12
 in England and Wales such couples 
remain infamously reliant upon the general law of trusts to effect redistribution in the event of 
relationship breakdown.
13
 
 This article focuses on succession law, and specifically the claims now available to 
unmarried couples in both England and Wales and Ireland.  It compares the eligibility criteria for 
such couples under the English Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 
“1975 Act”) and the Irish 2010 Act before examining the recognition of a broader range of 
interdependent relationships in Australia.  It argues that the 1975 and 2010 schemes cover a similar 
range of relationships in spite of using different methods of defining them, but suggests that both 
place undue weight upon whether or not the parties enjoyed a sexual relationship and held 
themselves out publically as a couple.  In this respect, they both compare unfavourably to 
developments in several Australian states and territories.   
Part II of the article provides an overview of succession law in Ireland and England and 
Wales, before Part III considers the respective definitions of a cohabiting couple used in the 2010 
and 1975 Acts.  It then argues that the recognition of non-conjugal relationships,
14
 which occurs in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
7
 The 2010 Act does not ensure either formal or substantive equality with heterosexual marriage for same-sex civil 
partners.  For example, the Law Reform Commission has said that the Act “does not address the relationship between 
same-sex couples and their children”: Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Legal Aspects of Family Relationships” 
(L.R.C. 101, Dublin 2010), para. [3.01].  The Coalition Government has promised to amend the 2010 Act in order to 
“address any anomalies or omissions, including those relating to children”: Coalition Government of Ireland, 
“Government for National Recovery 2011-16” (Dublin 2011), p. 56. 
8
 See, generally, 2010 Act, Parts 1-14.  Most of the Act commenced on 1 January 2011: Civil Partnership and Certain 
Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Commencement) Order 2010, SI 648 of 2010. 
9
 Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
10
 The scheme also excludes couples in a same-sex civil partnership with each other: 2010 Act, section 172(1). 
11
 2010 Act, Part 15. 
12
 Law Commission of England & Wales, “Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown” 
(Law Com. No. 307, London 2007).  See also the ill-fated Cohabitation Bill 2009, introduced by Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill. 
13
 See, e.g., S. Harris-Short and J. Miles, Family Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 2
nd
 edn. (Oxford 2011), ch. 3. 
14
 For a discussion of the extent to which a “conjugal” relationship and a “sexual” relationship are synonymous, see B. 
Cossman and B. Ryder, “What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality” (2001) 18 Canadian Journal of 
Family Law 269. 
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several Australian states and territories inter alia, is both preferable and justifiable in the particular 
context of succession law. 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT SUCCESSION LEGISLATION 
 
A. Ireland 
 
Before the 2010 Act, Ireland operated a comparatively less flexible law of succession, influenced by 
civil law systems.
15
  The Succession Act 1965 gave spouses a fixed entitlement to a share in the 
deceased’s estate irrespective of the terms of the deceased’s will16 and allowed only legal children 
of the deceased
17
 and former spouses
18
 to bring a claim for discretionary provision.  The spouse’s 
“legal right” has been extended, with some qualifications,19 to same-sex couples who have entered a 
civil partnership under the 2010 Act.
20
 
The new Act also enables “qualified cohabitants” to seek succession-based relief upon the 
death of their partners for the first time, broadly implementing recommendations of the Irish Law 
Reform Commission.
21
  In making its overall recommendations, the Commission sought to respond 
to the increasing numbers of cohabiting couples in Ireland,
22
 while admitting at the time of its 
Report that the incidence of cohabitation outside marriage was less common in Ireland than 
elsewhere.
23
  A stated objective was to balance “the notion of respect for autonomy and the right of 
individuals in cohabiting relationships to non-state involvement in their affairs” with “the concept 
of favouring substance over form”.24  
                                                          
15
 See, e.g., J.C. Brady, Succession Law in Ireland, 2
nd
 ed. (Dublin 1995), paras. [7-01]-[7-04].   
16
 Succession Act 1965, s. 111.  This “legal right” relates to half of the estate where there are no children and one third 
of it where there are children, and the spouse can elect whether to take the “legal right” or any provision made for him 
in the will: section 115. 
17
 Succession Act 1965, s. 118. 
18
 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s. 18. 
19
 J. Mee, “Succession and the Civil Partnership Bill 2009” (2009) 14 Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 86, 86-
88. 
20
 See, generally, 2010 Act, Part 8, amending the Succession Act 1965. 
21
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants” (L.R.C. 82, Dublin 2006). 
22
 The 2006 Census revealed a total of 121,800 family units consisting of cohabiting couples, as compared to 77,600 in 
2002: Central Statistics Office, “Census 2006: Principal Demographic Results” (Dublin 2007), p. 21. 
23
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, para. [1.06]. 
24
 Ibid.,  para. [1.14]. 
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Section 194 of the 2010 Act specifically facilitates an application by a member of a 
cohabiting couple for provision out of the net estate of his partner.  The court can make the 
provision that it “considers appropriate having regard to the rights of any other person having an 
interest in the matter”.25  It must be satisfied that “proper provision in the circumstances” was not 
made for the applicant during the deceased’s life.26  This idea of “proper” provision somewhat begs 
the question, although the concept is nevertheless used in the context of marital breakdown.
27
  The 
2010 Act itself provides limited guidance as to its interpretation, stipulating that the reason for the 
lack of such proper provision, leading to a potential claim under section 194, can be anything except 
“conduct by the applicant” that the court considers it “unjust to disregard”.28  The Act could 
therefore retrospectively uphold a cohabitant’s decision to punish his partner for undesirable 
conduct by refusing to make otherwise proper provision for him during their joint lives.   
The focus on provision made for the applicant during the joint lives of the parties may imply 
no expectation that a cohabitant will make testamentary provision for his partner.  At first glance, 
this contrasts with English Law’s focus on whether reasonable provision was made by will or the 
intestacy rules.
29
  That said, the Explanatory Memorandum for the original Irish Bill expressly 
assumed that testamentary provision would be included in the definition of “proper 
provision…during the lifetime of the deceased”,30 and any such provision is clearly a relevant 
factor.
31
 
When deciding whether to make an order, the court is instructed to consider all the 
circumstances of the case,
32
 including any order that is available inter vivos already made in favour 
of the applicant,
33
 any devise or bequest made to the applicant by the deceased (as noted above),
34
 
                                                          
25
 2010 Act, section 194(3). 
26
 2010 Act, section 194(3). 
27
 Constitution of Ireland, Article 41.3.2.iii. 
28
 2010 Act, section 194(3). 
29
 1975 Act, section 1(1). 
30
 Department of Justice, Equality & Law Reform (Ireland), “Civil Partnership Bill 2009: Explanatory Memorandum” 
(Dublin 2009), p. 26.  Cf. Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Draft Cohabitants Bill 2006” (Dublin 2006), cl. 11(2), 
which refers specifically to “adequate provision or no [provision] for the qualified cohabitant…whether by…will or 
otherwise”.  
31
 2010 Act, section 194(4)(b). 
32
 2010 Act, section 194(4). 
33
 2010 Act, section 194(4)(a). 
34
 2010 Act, section 194(4)(b).  Variations of such orders are also considered. 
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the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate,
35
 and the same factors considered on an application 
for the orders available inter vivos.
36
   
Only where the relationship ended before the death is an applicant for provision under 
section 194 required to demonstrate (prospective) financial dependence on the deceased.
37
  The 
Explanatory Memorandum for the original Bill suggests that only a dependent cohabitant could 
make a claim,
38
 but the subsequent insertion of the subsection dealing with relationships ending 
before death confirms that a claim could be made in the absence of dependence in the case of a 
subsisting relationship.  Indeed, the Law Reform Commission considered a test of economic 
dependency to be unnecessary in succession cases where the parties had not ended their 
relationship, precisely because it was still subsisting at the time of death and a succession-based 
remedy could be said to give effect to the presumed intention of the parties.
39
  In any case, a court is 
more likely to conclude that “proper provision” was not made where there was dependence, and the 
degree of financial dependence is considered when deciding whether the couple satisfied the 
definition of “cohabitants” in the first place.40 
Section 194 is clearly affected by the constitutional protection afforded to marriage.  
Provision made under it may not exceed the value of that to which the cohabitant would have been 
entitled had he been party to a marriage or civil partnership with the deceased.
41
  Moreover, the 
provision cannot affect the legal right of any surviving spouse,
42
 or the entitlements of spouses or 
civil partners under the Succession Act 1965.
43
  Unfortunately, the nature of the provision that the 
court can order does not appear to be the subject of further definition in the Act. 
In addition to the specific claim for provision out of an estate, it is expressly permissible to 
make one of the predominantly inter vivos orders introduced by the Act, the “compensatory 
                                                          
35
 2010 Act, section 194(4)(c). 
36
 2010 Act, section 194(4)(d), cross-referring to section 173(3).  For a list of these factors, see note 50. 
37
 2010 Act, section 194(5)(a). 
38
 Department of Justice, Equality & Law Reform (Ireland), “Civil Partnership Bill 2009: Explanatory Memorandum”, 
p. 1. 
39
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, para. [5.09].  This argument can 
justify a wider range of eligible applicants for testamentary as against inter vivos claims: see section III.C.2 below. 
40
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(c). 
41
 2010 Act, section 194(7). 
42
 2010 Act, section 194(10). 
43
 2010 Act, section 194(11)(b)-(c).  See J. Mee, “Succession and the Civil Partnership Bill 2009”, pp. 91-92 for 
criticism of the breadth of these provisions. 
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maintenance order”,44 “during the lifetime of either of the cohabitants”45 such that it may be 
relevant after the death of one party.  Nevertheless, it seems that such orders are primarily intended 
for relationships ending otherwise than by death, since (for example) the court can preclude a future 
application for provision from an estate under section 194 when making one of the orders available 
inter vivos.
46
  This is similar to the power possessed by English courts when disposing of 
applications for financial relief on divorce in relation to future applications for family provision.
47
 
The criteria for the orders available inter vivos, designed to provide a “safety-net system”,48 
are that the “qualified cohabitant” is “financially dependent” on the other cohabitant as a result of 
the relationship or the ending thereof, and that the court considers it “just and equitable” in “all the 
circumstances” to make the order.49  In deciding whether the “just and equitable” test is satisfied, 
the court is instructed to have regard to a number of factors contained in section 173(3).
50
   
Qualifying couples are expressly permitted to make an agreement governing what will 
happen to their finances inter alia where one of them dies, subject to various conditions.
51
  A valid 
                                                          
44
 2010 Act, section 175.  Such an order can comprise periodical and lump sum payments.  The sections concerning 
“property adjustment orders” (section 174) and “pension adjustment orders” (section 187) are less explicit in 
contemplating an application by a surviving cohabitant, although in any case the court is obliged to consider whether the 
needs of the applicant can practicably be met under sections 175 or 187 before making an order under section 174 
(section 174(2)). 
45
 2010 Act, section 175(1).  
46
 2010 Act, section 173(7).   
47
 1975 Act, section 15. 
48
 See, e.g., Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, para. [1.25]. 
49
 2010 Act, section 173(2). 
50
 These are the current and future “financial circumstances, needs and obligations” of the parties, the “rights and 
entitlements” of any current or former spouse or civil partner and of any dependent child or child from a previous 
relationship of the parties  (given that that the court is not allowed to make an order that would affect “any right” of any 
person to whom the respondent is or was married: (2010 Act, section 173(5)), the relationship’s duration, the basis on 
which it was entered and the degree of commitment involved in it, the past or likely future contribution made by each of 
the cohabitants to their collective or the other’s welfare, including to the other’s earning capacity, income or resources, 
their contributions “in looking after the home”, the effect on their earning capacity of the division of responsibilities 
during their relationship,  any disability suffered by the applicant,  and the conduct of both parties if it is such that the 
court considers it “unjust” to disregard it.   
51
 2010 Act, section 202(1).  The agreement must be in writing signed by both parties (section 202(2)(b)) and comply 
with the general law of contract (section 202(2)(c) although both parties must have received legal advice either 
independently or together (if they have waived their right to independent advice in writing: section 202(2)(a)). 
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agreement may bar applications for inter vivos or succession-based provision under the Act,
52
 
subject to the courts’ power to vary or set aside the agreement “in exceptional circumstances, where 
its enforceability would cause serious injustice”.53 
 The courts’ approach to the available orders will doubtless provoke discussion, especially 
given the Act’s complexity.  The legislature was content to specify a wide range of factors but also 
to leave doubts about the meaning of some provisions.  The concern of this article, however, is the 
definition of the “qualified cohabitant” for the purposes of succession law, and how it compares to 
its equivalent in English Law and to more inclusive provisions in Australia.  The next section of the 
article outlines the English law of family provision as a precursor to that discussion. 
 
B. England and Wales 
 
Unlike in Ireland, English Law applies a default rule of full testamentary freedom, with no 
compulsory portions of the estate reserved in cases where the deceased left a will.
54
  Family 
provision, now governed by the 1975 Act, is an important exception to that principle.  It originally
55
 
allowed spouses
56
 and certain dependent children
57
 to bring a claim against a deceased person’s 
                                                          
52
 2010 Act, section 202(3).  The extent of the validity of equivalent contracts barring applications under the 1975 Act is 
unclear.  Lowe and Douglas, for example, presume that (at least) a spouse cannot contract out of his right to make such 
an application except via a consent order made by a court: N. Lowe and G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law, 10th edn. 
(Oxford 2007), p. 1124. 
53
 2010 Act, section 202(4). 
54
 See, e.g., Re Coventry (deceased) [1980] Ch. 461, 474 per Oliver J. 
55
 For a detailed discussion of the original Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, see S.M. Cretney, Family Law in 
the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford 2003), pp. 485-498. 
56
 The relevant provision is now contained in the 1975 Act: section 1(1)(a), which, in its amended form, also includes 
civil partners (who must be of the same sex).  Former spouses and civil partners who have not entered a subsequent 
marriage or civil partnership may also be eligible for provision (section 1(1)(b)), but it is rarely made: see, e.g., 
Cameron v. Treasury Solicitor  [1996] 2 F.L.R. 716, 723 per Thorpe L.J. 
57
 No dependency or age-based requirements are now imposed as regards the eligibility of the deceased’s legal children 
(1975 Act, section 1(1)(c)), and those whom she treated as a child of the family in relation to a marriage or civil 
partnership are also able to make an application (section 1(1)(d)).  Nevertheless, it has been recognised that “[a] person 
who is physically capable of earning his own living faces a difficult task in getting provision made for him…” (Re 
Dennis (Deceased) [1981] 2 All E.R. 140, 145 per Browne-Wilkinson J.).  For a comparative analysis of claims by 
adult children who provide care for their parents in England and Wales and Ireland, see B. Sloan, “Testamentary 
Freedom and Caring Adult Offspring In England & Wales and Ireland” in K. Boele-Woelki, J. Miles and J.M. Scherpe 
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estate where any will and/or the rules of intestacy
58
 failed to make reasonable provision for them.
59
  
Since the commencement of the 1975 Act, some unmarried couples in England and Wales have in 
practice been able to bring a claim alongside other factual dependants even though they lack a 
formal legal relationship with their deceased partners.
60
  However, when claiming as a “dependant”, 
a surviving member of a couple can be eligible for provision only if he manages to show that “the 
deceased, otherwise than for full valuable consideration, was making a substantial contribution in 
money or money’s worth towards the reasonable needs of [the applicant]”.61  It was the narrowness 
of this category inter alia that led to the introduction of a specific category for cohabitants in 1995, 
which does not require dependence as far as eligibility is concerned.
62
   
The “dependant” category nevertheless remains useful for those claimants who fail to satisfy 
the particular definition reserved for cohabiting couples in the Act, which is considered in Part III.  
In Churchill v. Roach, for example, the applicant was unable to satisfy the minimum duration 
requirement in order to apply as a member of an eligible couple, but the deceased was held to have 
been maintaining her before his death such that she could claim as a dependant.
63
 
 In any case, the link with maintenance is ever-present in the 1975 Act.  In contrast to the 
position in Ireland, applicants other than spouses and civil partners
64
 must always show that any 
will and/or the intestacy rules did not make reasonable provision for their maintenance.
65
  That said, 
the courts have been generous in their interpretation of “maintenance” when considering eligible 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(eds.), The Future of Family Property in Europe: Proceedings of the 4th Conference of the Commission on European 
Family Law (Cambridge 2011). 
58
 The intestacy rules are contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925, s. 46.  The Irish equivalent of family 
provision for spouses and children applies only where the deceased died testate: Succession Act 1965, s. 109. 
59
 1975 Act, section 1(1). 
60
 1975 Act, section 1(1)(e).  
61
 1975 Act, section 1(3).  The subsection provides that the applicant “shall be treated” as being maintained where its 
terms  apply, and  it was interpreted as imposing a condition that is both necessary and sufficient in Re Beaumont 
(Deceased) [1980] Ch. 444. 
62
 Law Commission of England & Wales, “Distribution on Intestacy” (Law Com. No. 187, London 1989). 
63
 [2002] EWHC 3230 (Ch), [2004] 2 F.L.R. 989. 
64
 1975 Act, section 1(2)(a-aa). 
65
 1975 Act, section 1(2)(b).   
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cohabitants,
66
 and the English Law Commission has proposed the removal of the restriction for such 
applicants.
67
 
A number of factors to which the court should have regard in determining whether 
reasonable provision has been made, and what provision should be made by the court if it has not 
otherwise been made, are specified in the Act.  Some of these apply to all applicants,
68
 while others 
apply to particular categories.
69
  In the case of claims by members of cohabiting couples, who are 
not currently included in the intestacy rules,
70
 the court is instructed to consider the applicant’s age 
and the length of time for which he satisfied the eligibility criteria,
71
 as well as “the contribution 
made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the deceased, including any contribution made 
by looking after the home or caring for the family”.72 
The court can make a range of orders for provision out of the estate.  These are expressly 
contained in the 1975 Act, an advantage over the Irish provisions.
73
  Available orders include 
periodical payments, lump sum orders and orders for the transfer of property. 
The next part of the article considers the definition of relevant unmarried couples in both 
English and Irish succession law, before comparing them to the range of relationships recognised in 
some Australian states and territories. 
 
 
III. DEFINING ELIGIBLE COUPLES 
 
This part of the article begins by outlining the general approach to definition of a relevant couple in 
England and Wales and Ireland.  It then critically examines the focus on sexual relations as a 
                                                          
66
 Negus v. Bahouse [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch), [2008] 1 F.L.R. 381; cf. Baker v. Baker [2008] EWHC 937 (Ch); [2008] 
2 F.L.R. 767, at [66] per Paul Girolami QC. 
67
 Law Commission of England & Wales, “Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death: A Consultation Paper” 
(Consultation Paper 191, London 2009), para. [4.134]. 
68
 1975 Act, section 3(1). 
69
 1975 Act, section 3(2)-(4). 
70
 The same is true in Ireland: 2010 Act, Part 8.  Cf. Law Commission of England & Wales, “Intestacy and Family 
Provision Claims on Death”, ch. 4, which provisionally recommends a sliding scale of entitlement for cohabitants in 
England and Wales on the intestacy of their partners based on the length of the relationship concerned. 
71
 1975 Act, section 3(2A)(a). 
72
 1975 Act, section 3(2A)(b). 
73
 1975 Act, section 2. 
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qualifying factor in both jurisdictions before making a case for the recognition of a broader range of 
relationships. 
 
A. Approaches to Definition 
 
1. Ireland 
 
Under the Irish 2010 Act, a “cohabitant” is defined by section 172 as “one of [two] adults (whether 
of the same or the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an intimate and committed 
relationship”.74  The cohabitants must not have been married to, or in a civil partnership with, each 
other,
75
 and they must have been outside of the prohibited degrees in relation to each other.
76
 In 
determining whether a couple satisfy the definition of “cohabitant”, the court is instructed to 
consider “all the circumstances of the relationship”, but with “particular” regard to a number of 
factors.
77
  These are contained in section 172(2) of the 2010 Act, and they effectively serve as a 
checklist. This approach is followed in several Commonwealth jurisdictions,
78
 and indeed the Law 
Reform Commission expressly cited the relevant New South Wales legislation when setting out its 
proposed list.
79
 
The relevant considerations in the 2010 Act are the relationship’s duration,80 the “basis on 
which the couple live together”,81 the extent of any financial dependence of “either adult on the 
other” as well as any agreements concerning their finances82 and the “degree and nature of any 
                                                          
74
 2010 Act, section 172(1). 
75
 2010 Act, section 172(1). 
76
 The prohibited degrees of relationship are defined (with reference to other enactments) in section 172(4) of the 2010 
Act. 
77
 2010 Act, section 172(2). 
78
 See, e.g., Family Law Act 1975, s. 4AA(2) (Commonwealth of Australia); Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s. 4 
(NZ). 
79
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, para. [2.07], n. 12, citing Property 
(Relationships) Act 1984, s. 4 (NSW) (which applies a near-identical definition of a de facto relationship to that used 
for the purposes of a family provision claim; see now Interpretation Act 1987, s. 21C (NSW), referenced in a note in 
Succession Act 2006, s. 57 (NSW)). 
80
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(a). 
81
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(b). 
82
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(c). 
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financial arrangements”, expressed to include the joint purchase of property,83 whether there are any 
dependent children
84
 and whether one party cares for the children of the other,
85
 and “the degree to 
which the adults present themselves to others as a couple”.86 
 The Irish Law Reform Commission’s Draft Cohabitants Bill contained the proviso that:  
 
No finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in [the equivalent provision to section 
172(2)], or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the 
purpose of determining that two adults are cohabitants; and in determining whether they are 
cohabitants, regard may be had to those matters, and to attach such weight to those matters, 
as is appropriate in the circumstances.
87
 
 
Similar provisions are included, for example, in the equivalent New South Wales
88
 and New 
Zealand
89
 legislation.  However, such a declaration has not been included in the eventual 2010 Act. 
This could have significant consequences when the Act comes to be interpreted by the judiciary if 
the absence of such a provision reinforces the notion that some factors must necessarily be present 
before the parties to a relationship are deemed to be “cohabitants”. 
The succession-related reforms in the Act do not apply even to all those who do satisfy its 
definition of “cohabitant”.  It therefore further defines the “qualified cohabitant” by setting down 
minimum durations for which he and his partner must have lived as a couple.
90
  The relevant 
duration is two years where the cohabitants are both the parents of at least one dependent child,
91
 
and five years otherwise.
92
  A child is considered dependent if he is under 18, under 23 and in full-
time education, or “incapable of taking care of his or her own needs because of a mental or physical 
                                                          
83
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(d). 
84
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(e). 
85
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(f). 
86
 2010 Act, section 172(2)(g). 
87
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Draft Cohabitants Bill 2006”, cl. 3(3). 
88
 Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s. 4(3) (NSW); see also Interpretation Act 1987, s. 21C (NSW). 
89
 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s. 2D(3) (NZ). 
90
 2010 Act, section 172(5).  According to section 206, an application for one of the orders mentioned in section 173 
cannot be made unless the relationship ended (by death or otherwise) after the legislation commenced (in January 
2011), but the length of the relationship is measured to include time before commencement.  Section 206 does not 
expressly mention applications under section 194 for provision out of an estate, but section 173(7) does so in passing. 
91
 2010 Act, section 172(5)(a). 
92
 2010 Act, section 172(5)(b). 
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disability”.93  The final Act is therefore restrictively applied to couples without dependent children 
of their own.  A three-year minimum duration was set down for such childless applicants in the 
original Bill,
94
 mirroring the Law Reform Commission’s proposal.95  But the Justice Minister 
himself introduced the five-year amendment in the Committee stage, apparently following lobbying 
from the Irish Farmers Association.
96
  While economic disadvantage is more likely to accrue where 
children are present and the redistribution of property inter vivos raises difficult issues in shorter 
relationships, five years is an excessive period before which a cohabitant can even be eligible to 
seek provision from an estate of which his deceased partner has no subsisting need. 
The Act also takes a conservative approach to cohabiting parties with subsisting marriages 
to third parties.  Whatever the duration of the relationship, if either party to the relationship was 
married to (but apparently not in a civil partnership with) someone else, neither cohabitant will be 
“qualified” unless each married party lived apart from his spouse for at least four in the previous 
five years.
97
  This restriction was not proposed in the Law Reform Commission’s Draft Bill.98  It 
eventually
99
 took the view that while the entitlements of a current or former spouse of a cohabitant 
should be taken into account and notice of the proceedings should be given to such a person, “an 
existing marriage should not be a bar to an application under the proposed redress model”.100  
Part of the conservatism in the Act can be explained by Irish divorce law itself, which sets 
down the same separation period before a divorce can be granted as for qualified cohabitants who 
are still married,
101
 and by the constitutional protection afforded to marriage in Ireland.
102
  It will 
already be apparent that anxiety about the potential to conflict with the Constitution permeates the 
Act’s passing.  In an example from a different context, on the advice of the Attorney General the 
Justice Minister opined that “to comply with the Constitution, it is necessary to differentiate the 
                                                          
93
 2010 Act, section 171. 
94
 Civil Partnership Bill 2009 (as introduced), cl. 170(5)(b). 
95
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Draft Cohabitants Bill 2006”, cl. 3(4)(a). 
96
 Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights, “Civil Partnership Bill 2009: Committee Stage 
(Resumed)”, 27 May 2010 <http://debates.oireachtas.ie/JUS/2010/05/27/00003.asp>.  
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 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Draft Cohabitants Bill 2006”, cl. 3. 
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 Cf. Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Consultation Paper on the Rights and Duties of Cohabitees” (L.R.C. C.P. 
32, Dublin 2004), para. [1.24]. 
100
 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, para. [2.22]. 
101
 Constitution of Ireland, Article 41.3.2.  Civil partners are able to gain a decree of dissolution in less restricted 
circumstances: 2010 Act, section 110. 
102
 Constitution of Ireland, Article 41.3.1. 
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recognition being accorded to same-sex couples who register their partnership with the special 
recognition accorded under the Constitution to persons of the opposite sex who marry”.103  
Moreover, when writing about de facto relationships Walsh and Ryan were conscious that “too 
ready an equation between marriage and other alternative family forms may amount to an attack on 
marriage” for the purposes of the Constitution.104  Many would question the extent to which it is 
necessary to withhold rights from those who do not marry in order to protect those who do,
105
 but 
caution was inevitable against the backdrop of a written Constitution protecting heterosexual 
marriage. 
 In a departure from the Irish Law Reform Commission’s proposal,106 however, the minimum 
period prescribed by the 2010 Act does not have to end with death.  This may be said to be 
justifiable on the basis of the inter vivos liability imposed by the Act.  A qualified cohabitant can 
make an application under section 194 where the relationship ended up to two years before the 
death of his partner.  Even if the relationship ended more than two years before the death, an 
application can still be made where the applicant was in receipt of periodical payments,
107
 or an 
application for an inter vivos order
108
 (or for a variation of such an order)
109
 had previously been 
made and the proceedings were pending or any order was not executed by the time of death.  That 
said, an application under section 194 is less likely to succeed where the relevant relationship ended 
before the death of one of the partners.
110
  A claim is barred if the applicant has subsequently 
entered a marriage or civil partnership,
111
  and even if he has not done so, as discussed above, he 
must satisfy the court that he “is financially dependent on the deceased”112 according to a 
subsection employing rather questionable usage of the present tense. 
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 Parliamentary Debates, Dáil Éirann, Vol. 697, No. 1 (Thursday 3 December 2009), p. 109 (Deputy Dermot Ahern).  
104
 J. Walsh and F. Ryan, The Rights of De Facto Couples (Dublin 2006), p. 82. 
105
 See, by analogy, M v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 A.C. 91, at [114] per 
Baroness Hale. 
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111
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section 5 of the Act. 
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2. England and Wales 
 
English Law, of course, is untrammelled by constitutional protection of marriage.  The 1975 Act 
adopts a similar definition of the relevant cohabitation relationship to that used in Ireland, albeit 
with an approach to the minimum duration that is both less nuanced and significantly less 
conservative than the 2010 Act.  The 1975 Act allows claims by applicants who did not formalise 
the relationship but “during the whole of the period of two years ending immediately before the date 
when the deceased died” lived “in the same household as the deceased” as either his spouse113 or his 
civil partner,
114
 whether or not either party has a subsisting marriage or civil partnership to a third 
party
115
 and without any special provision for couples with children.  There is one respect in which 
the approach to definition in the English and Irish schemes could become closer in the future, since 
the English Law Commission recently suggested the removal of the marriage and civil partnership 
analogies and an alternative test of whether the deceased and the applicant were “living as a couple 
in a joint household”.116  But another of the recommendations in its 2009 Consultation Paper could 
increase the distance between the schemes, since it proposed the removal of the minimum duration 
requirement for cohabitants who were both the legal parents of one or more children, apparently 
without reference to the dependency of such children.
117
 
 The requirement that the relationship ends with death in the 1975 Act provides one respect 
in which the range of cohabitational relationships covered appears narrower than under the 2010 
Act, although it has been seen in a previous section that restrictions are placed on claims by parties 
to Irish relationships that have ended before the other party dies.  Moreover, significant flexibility 
has surrounded the interpretation of the two-year period ending with death in English cases where, 
for example, the now-deceased cohabitant spent a significant period in hospital
118
 or the parties 
underwent a temporary separation before the death.
119
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 See, e.g., Re Watson (Deceased) [1999] 1 F.L.R. 878, 883 per Neuberger J. 
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 See, e.g., Gully v. Dix [2004] EWCA Civ 139, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1399 at [16] per Ward L.J. 
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 An apparently more significant difference is that the 1975 Act does not elaborate upon its 
definition using a checklist, leaving judges to flesh it out when deciding cases.  But in spite of the 
formal differences between the English and Irish legislation and the fact that the Irish Law Reform 
Commission did not explicitly cite any English family provision cases in its final report, English 
case law has deemed many of the factors listed in the 2010 Act to be important in determining 
whether or not a couple have lived in the same household as spouses or civil partners.  For example, 
when considering what it meant for a couple to live in the same household in Churchill v. Roach, 
and although he was conscious of the dangers of seeking to define such a relationship conclusively, 
Judge Norris QC opined: 
 
It seems to me to have elements of permanence, to involve a consideration of the frequency 
and intimacy of contact, to contain an element of mutual support, to require some 
consideration of the degree of voluntary restraint upon personal freedom which each party 
undertakes, and to involve an element of community of resources.
120
 
 
An analysis of the extent to which any given relationship exhibits these features is likely to be 
similar to one undertaken when applying the Irish Act.  Some of the overlapping features, including 
whether the relationship is “intimate” and “committed”, form part of the basic definition of 
cohabitants under the 2010 Act.  Several of the section 172(2) factors, namely the basis and 
duration of the relationship and the parties’ financial dependence and arrangements, are also 
entirely consistent with Judge Norris QC’s conception of a household shared by a couple.  
Responsibilities towards children were not at issue in the particular case of Churchill, but they are 
also likely to be given significant weight in English Law.
121
   
 Despite these different methods of defining the relevant relationship, it therefore seems that 
the two pieces of legislation will cover similar sorts of association, although the differences in the 
relevant lengths of association are significant.  If anything, the Irish method of definition is to be 
preferred (even if its conservatism as regards relationship length is not) since it prevents the court 
from having to make a value judgment about what a spousal relationship (or its civil partnership 
equivalent) should look like for the purposes of comparison.  Indeed, the Irish Law Reform 
Commission deliberately sought to avoid an analogy with marriage when proposing the definition 
                                                          
120
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of a relevant “cohabitant”,122  and its counterpart in England and Wales has since acknowledged the 
weakness of such an analogy.
123
 
 Inevitably, however, the model contained in the 2010 Act does present the difficult task of 
prioritising a diverse range of considerations, and the English Law Commission has expressed 
concern about the possibility that such a list could introduce a “box-ticking mentality”.124  Overall, 
the checklist approach does at least provide substantive and explicit guidance on the nature of the 
relationship that is the subject of regulation, and is advantageous provided a flexible approach is 
adopted by the judiciary and no factor is considered necessary or sufficient without strong 
justification.  The next section of this article considers an aspect of the relevant relationship, namely 
the sexual element, in respect of which neither the new Irish legislation nor the English case law 
exhibits enough flexibility. 
 
B. The Sexual Nature of Coupledom 
 
1. Ireland 
 
Unlike the Law Reform Commission’s Draft Bill,125 the list of factors in section 172(2) of the Irish 
2010 Act makes no specific reference to the presence or absence of sexual intimacy as a pertinent 
consideration regarding eligibility.  Nevertheless, section 172(3) of the Act states “[f]or the 
avoidance of doubt” that a relationship does not “cease” to qualify as one of cohabitation “merely 
because it is no longer sexual in nature”.  There is therefore a clear assumption that two 
“cohabitants” will have engaged in sexual activity at some point over the course of the relationship.  
That assumption is reinforced by the exclusion of those within the prohibited degrees of relationship 
from the definition of “cohabitant”, and from the absence of any proviso that no one factor is to be 
regarded as necessary for the purposes of establishing the existence of a relevant cohabitation 
relationship.  The Act also makes reference to the public nature of coupledom by including “the 
degree to which the adults present themselves to others as a couple” among the checklist factors.126  
While a publicly-acknowledged couple-based relationship is not an absolute requirement on the 
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 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, “Report: Rights and Duties of Cohabitants”, paras. [2.04]-[2.05]. 
123
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face of the legislation, it is open to the judiciary to render it so in the future in spite of the degree of 
flexibility inherent in the Act. 
The Act’s lack of application to non-conjugal relationships127 and the prospect of courts 
examining the intimate details of the parties’ sexual lives (or lack thereof)128 were raised with 
concern during the Parliamentary debates, to no immediate avail.  Even a member of the Dáil 
Éirann who raised the issue of non-conjugal relationships admitted that the Act may not have been 
“the most appropriate vehicle” through which to provide for them.129  This is consistent with 
reaction to the “wrecking amendment” proposed as the English Civil Partnership Bill passed 
through the House of Lords, which would have opened up civil partnership registration to certain 
people within the prohibited degrees.
130
  Nevertheless, as argued below,
131
 such concerns are 
attenuated in the particular context of succession law.  Moreover, the inclusion of informal 
relationships in an opt-out scheme should raise fewer questions of status than the provision of a 
marriage-like institution for same-sex couples. 
Even following the 2010 Act, then, Irish law remains wedded to the marital or at least 
conjugal tie as a pre-requisite for judicial intervention in property matters where the parties are not 
parent and child, whether the intervention occurs while both parties are still alive or after one of 
them dies.  This is in spite of the lack of priority given to testamentary freedom in Ireland in the 
first place as a result of the spouse’s “legal right”, the potential for parents, siblings and other blood 
relatives to inherit under the intestacy rules,
132
 and the relief from inheritance tax granted to non-
conjugal cohabitants in certain circumstances.
133
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2. England and Wales 
 
English family provision law appears to make similar assumptions about sexual intimacy forming 
part of the essence of coupledom.  While the prohibited degrees of relationship
134
 are not 
specifically referenced in the definition of the relevant relationship, it is extremely unlikely that the 
judiciary would hold that two people within the prohibited degrees could be “living…as” spouses or 
civil partners.
135
  In Re Watson (Deceased),
136
 it was held that an elderly couple who shared neither 
a bedroom nor a sexual relationship while they lived together did in fact satisfy the requirements of 
section 1(1A) of the 1975 Act.  Neuberger J. noted that the couple had shared a common domestic 
life for over a decade.  On the other hand, the judge was apparently influenced by the fact that they 
had enjoyed a sexual relationship at an earlier stage in their lives, albeit before they lived together, 
and that they had been prevented from setting up home together at that point due to obligations 
owed towards their respective parents.  Neuberger J. also rejected the suggestion that it was 
sufficient to show that the deceased and the applicant had a relationship that could potentially be 
enjoyed by a husband and wife.
137
   
Thus, while both the English case law and section 172(3) of the 2010 Act have made 
concessions to old age as regards the importance of sexual ties, it is unlikely that a couple who have 
never engaged in a sexual relationship will qualify under the cohabitation provisions of either the 
2010 or the 1975 Acts. 
Moreover, in line with the Irish legislation, emphasis was placed on the public nature of 
coupledom in the unfortunate English case of Baynes v. Hedger.
138
  In that case, although he had 
already decided that the deceased and her putative same-sex cohabitant did not share a household in 
any event, Lewison J. also concluded that it was “not possible to establish that two persons have 
lived together as civil partners unless their relationship as a couple is an acknowledged one”.139  He 
therefore decided that the two elderly women had not lived together as such because their 
relationship as a couple was not openly acknowledged. This is unsurprising since, for example, their 
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50-year “loving relationship”140 began at a time when private and consensual sexual activity 
between two males remained a criminal offence.
141
  Lewison J. drew his conclusion in spite of 
Neuberger J.’s opinion, expressed in Re Watson, to the effect that both “internal” and “external” 
elements are relevant when considering the nature of the relationship and, if anything, internal 
elements are more important.
142
  The New South Wales Law Reform Commission specifically 
addressed the difficulty present in Baynes v. Hedger by recommending that the equivalent 
legislation there should require the court to consider “possible reasons for parties not holding 
themselves out publicly as a couple, arising from the social context in which their relationship 
existed” to address this difficulty.143  At a time when the acceptance of same-sex relationships 
remains far from universal,
144
 this pragmatic suggestion has much to commend it.  As will become 
clear below, however, the law of family provision in New South Wales is much less focussed on 
conjugal coupledom in any event.
145
  
It has been seen that English Law does attempt to recognise a form of dependence per se, 
without reference to a sexual relationship, using a specific category of applicant.
146
  This is true 
even if the applicant must demonstrate material dependence on the deceased, and if interpretations 
of the relevant statutory provisions have on occasion suggested that the more an applicant has done 
for the deceased, the less likely it is that his claim will succeed.
147
 This is because the “full valuable 
consideration” that the applicant must avoid providing for the maintenance has been interpreted as 
including benefits conferred otherwise than under a contract, such that the contributions of the 
claimant and the deceased must be balanced.
148
   In Plumley v. Bishop, however, Butler-Sloss L.J. 
considered it important to avoid “fine balancing computations involving the value of normal 
exchanges of support in the domestic sense”.149  Building on this, the English Law Commission has 
recommended an approach based on factual dependency on the relationship itself rather than on a 
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“flow of benefits” from the deceased to the applicant.150  This suggestion should be welcomed, 
since it avoids the difficult question of which party is truly dependent on the other.
151
  Moreover, 
where a provider of a domestic or other service has been promised testamentary provision by the 
deceased, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may be able to provide a remedy irrespective of (and 
perhaps strengthened by)
152
 the lack of a familial or conjugal relationship with the deceased.
153
  But 
for the moment, albeit to a lesser extent than for its Irish equivalent, a sexual relationship remains a 
key feature of eligibility under the 1975 Act where the applicant was not related by blood or 
marriage/civil partnership
154
 to the deceased. 
 
C. The Case for Greater Inclusion 
 
1. Lessons from Australia 
 
The focus on conjugal couples (who are publically recognised as such) present in both English and 
Irish succession law differs significantly from the position in Australia.
155
  A number of Australian 
states and territories have recognised non-conjugal relationships for various purposes, including the 
distribution of property inter vivos and on death, often on the basis of the presence of care and 
support.
156
  For example, various rights were attached to “domestic relationships” in New South 
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Wales in 1999.
157
  The concept of a “domestic relationship” includes not only a de facto (conjugal) 
relationship
158
 but also a “close personal relationship”.159  The recognition of the “close personal 
relationship” sought to provide “an avenue for redress for people who suffer some detriment (and 
are not compensated for it) because of the care and support they provide to another, be it an elderly 
or ailing parent or friend or neighbour, for no fee or reward”.160   Such a relationship exists 
“between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living together, one or each 
of whom provides the other with domestic support and personal care”.161  A party to a close 
personal relationship can override testamentary freedom by bringing a claim for discretionary 
provision out of the other party’s estate under the Succession Act 2006162 provided the relationship 
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subsisted at the time of death
163
 and “having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether 
past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application”.164   
The requirement of subsistence at the time of death for a “close personal relationship” is 
more restrictive than the Irish criteria for a “qualifying cohabitant” and the “living together” 
requirement imposes an additional hurdle as compared to the English “dependants” category (albeit 
that the English category is restrictive in other respects).
165
  But the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal has suggested that the common residence requirement might be “somewhat more 
attenuated” for the purposes of a close personal relationship than for a de facto relationship,166 and 
it is clear that a wide range of relationships are included so long as the amount of support and care 
provided is significant.  As McColl J.A. said in the Court of Appeal case of Hayes v. Marquis, “if 
two adults lived together fulltime and one provided domestic support and personal care to the other 
only once or twice a year, it would be difficult to say that a close personal relationship had been 
established”.167   
Taking an alternative approach, albeit one affecting the intestacy rules and not family 
provision,
168
  Tasmania has introduced a registration scheme for “caring relationships”.169  Some 
consequences can flow from such relationships even if they are not registered.
170
  While Graycar 
and Millbank point to the apparent lack of use of the registration scheme and claim that there is “no 
empirical evidence to demonstrate an unmet legal need for any broadly-based recognition of non-
couple relationships”,171 they admit that that lack of public information may be a factor.172 
Inevitably, many of the problems with opt-in schemes for unmarried cohabitants are likely to apply 
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in this context,
173
 and it may be unreasonable to expect a significant number of people formally to 
register “caring relationships” for cultural reasons.174  
Although the New South Wales Law Reform Commission similarly reported that few claims 
have been brought by people in “close personal relationships” under the non-registration scheme 
there and that claims tend to be presented as falling within another category of applicant instead,
175
 
that is not always true.  In Hughes v. Charlton, for example, “the evidence point[ed] to the 
[applicant] being a housekeeper for the deceased”, and the applicant was therefore eligible for 
family provision only as a result of the “close personal relationship” category.176   
 
2. Policy Arguments 
 
The Australian models considered above demonstrate that it is at least possible to allow succession 
claims by parties to relationships primarily characterised by domestic support rather than blood, 
marital, or conjugal ties.  This section attempts to address some of the policy arguments against the 
inclusion of such applicants (or applicants whose lives are otherwise intertwined except by virtue of 
a sexual relationship) within or alongside the couple-based provisions of the 1975 and 2010 Acts. 
It has been said that “[t]here is very little research in Ireland or elsewhere on non-conjugal 
relationships”.177  But any uncertainty surrounding the level of need for recognition of non-conjugal 
relationships should not be allowed to detract from the problems of principle with focusing on 
sexual intimacy (whether or not it produces children) as a necessary factor triggering inclusion, as 
distinct from a factor affecting the success of a given claim.  Indeed, several scholars have 
questioned the relevance of sexual intimacy to relationship recognition.
178
  For example, Wong has 
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argued that there is “no logical reason to limit access to the law to only couple-based relationships” 
in a conjugal sense.
179
  Baroness Deech has emphasised that “sexual activity itself does not cause 
dependency”,180 and Choudhry and Herring note that two people who live together and have a 
sexual relationship do not per se “provide any particular benefit to the rest of society”.181   
By contrast, those who provide domestic and other support to each other, without 
necessarily being in a conjugal relationship, do provide a benefit to society and each other.
182
  
Indeed, Fineman considers society to be dependent on the “caretaking labor”183 of “derivative 
dependants”, i.e. those who assume or are assigned responsibility for the care of someone who is 
inevitably dependent on others.
184
   She criticises the fact that most of the costs of care are borne by 
the people providing the care themselves rather than being distributed amongst the true 
beneficiaries of care, whether institutional or individual.  Fineman’s writings have been said to 
require a recognition of “desert” in allocating resources.185  Citing Fineman’s work, Choudhry and 
Herring discuss an “alternative vision” based on a “carer-dependant” paradigm, albeit admitting that 
it would produce “a very different kind of family law”.186  Whether the relevant relationship is 
properly characterised as “dependent” or “interdependent”,187 and whatever precise factors may 
justify its recognition or non-recognition, many legal systems reflect a reluctance to move “beyond 
conjugality”188 as far as such recognition is concerned.189  Fineman has warned of the dangers of 
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“duplicating the privileged form” of marriage even when recognising non-marital relationships,190 
although it is worth noting that in English Law a sexual relationship is not an absolute requirement 
of a valid marriage and is not a requirement of a valid civil partnership at all.
191
  This only 
strengthens the argument in favour of abandoning sexual ties as a necessary feature of a recognised 
relationship outside of marriage.  
 Of course, it is important to consider public expectations with regard to which sorts of 
relationship are likely to be the subject of regulation and which are not,
192
 even if the intention of 
the deceased person is not conclusive in the context of succession and family provision law.
193
  
Consideration of the deceased’s expectations about the range of claims on his estate may go some 
way towards justifying an invasive inquiry into the sexual habits of a couple.  Peart has criticised 
the uncertainty surrounding the parameters of the default and distinctly fixed property division 
scheme applied both inter vivos and on death to unmarried couples in New Zealand,
194
  where a 
sexual relationship is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring a partner within the relevant 
definition.  In Scragg v. Scott,
195
 for example, it was confirmed that two people who never lived 
together or had a sexual relationship but regarded themselves as a “close and devoted couple”196 
could be within the property division legislation.
197
  Nevertheless, definitional difficulties are an 
inevitable feature of schemes regulating informal relationships and should not preclude attempts at 
reform.  Moreover, the fact that succession claims for non-conjugal couples would in all likelihood 
be subject to more discretion in England and Wales or Ireland than in New Zealand itself reduces 
the potential injustice caused by uncertainty in the eligibility criteria.  The law should be more 
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interested in whether the parties to a relationship have become economically interdependent or 
whether there is some similar factor (such as the provision of care and domestic support) justifying 
redistribution, and less interested in the nature of the parties’ sex lives.   
In this context, it is significant that a wider range of applicants can apply for provision on 
death under the English 1975 Act than during the lives of the parties.  Indeed, in spite of the 
political difficulties in securing statutory inter vivos redistribution of unmarried couples’ 
property,
198
 the reforms accommodating such couples within the 1975 Act were described as in 
Parliament a “useful and uncontroversial measure of law reform”.199  This discrepancy is justifiable 
for a number of reasons, notwithstanding the fact that the absence of a comprehensive
200
 statutory 
remedy in England and Wales facilitating redistribution of conjugal couples’ property when 
relationships end other than by death (even on a subtler basis) is illogical.
201
  Although testamentary 
freedom is an important principle in the common law world, it is already diluted in Ireland and 
Borkowski has noted that English testators were substantially unencumbered for only about a 
century.
202
  It is clear as a matter of logic that a deceased person no longer has any substantial need 
of his property, and this contrasts sharply with the situation where property is divided inter vivos.  
Peart has acknowledged that “the preservation and security of the family” is one of the purposes of 
succession law,
203
 and it could be said that a broad understanding of “family” should be permitted 
for this purpose.
204
  A testamentary claim need not require the “breakdown” of a relationship, with 
all its conjugal connotations, and such a claim is more likely to reflect the intention of the parries 
than where a relationship has broken down inter vivos and a remedy is sought.
205
  Eekelaar is also 
more willing to contemplate a succession claim than an inter vivos one in the context of an altruistic 
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friendship-based relationship,
206
 and Mee has accepted that for the purposes of recognising non-
marital relationships it is “certainly arguable that the same qualifying criteria should not apply 
across all areas of the law”.207   
The distinction between inter vivos and succession claims is borne out in practice in New 
South Wales.  Although inter vivos claims are available to people in “close personal 
relationships”,208 the Law Reform Commission has said that few such claims are brought.209  By 
contrast, a significant number of cases involving testamentary claims by parties to “close personal 
relationships” have been reported.210 
An Options Paper commissioned by the Irish Department of Justice, which eventually led to 
the introduction of the Civil Partnership Bill (later renamed), concluded that more research was 
necessary before proposals encompassing non-conjugal relationships could be made.
211
  The Paper 
cited the Irish Law Reform Commission’s conclusion that “it is not possible to devise a single 
scheme for the determination of legal rights and duties which can operate fairly and evenly across a 
spectrum of relationships ranging from on the one hand ‘marriage like’ relationships to familial or 
platonic relationships on the other”.212  This is similar to the English Law Commission’s 
conclusion, made during its “Sharing Homes” project, that “[i]t is not possible…to devise a 
statutory scheme for the ascertainment and quantification of beneficial interests in the shared home 
which can operate fairly and evenly across the diversity of domestic circumstances which are now 
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to be encountered”,213 which was itself cited by the Law Reform Commission.214  Again, however, 
this attitude need not apply with regard to succession law, and factual dependants had been eligible 
family provision applicants for decades in England and Wales when the Law Commission there 
drew its conclusion.  Conversely, the fact that the both the Irish Law Reform Commission and the 
final 2010 Act rejected a threshold of economic dependency for the purposes of claims in 
relationships ending with death, as opposed to inter vivos claims, demonstrates an 
acknowledgement that testamentary claims involve distinctive considerations and throws into doubt 
the need for a “single scheme”. 
Undoubtedly, a large number of relationships where provision out of an estate is justified 
will satisfy the eligibility criteria contained in the 2010 Act as well as the 1975 Act.  But the 
assumptions about the importance of sexual intimacy made even by the succession aspects of the 
2010 Act as well as (to a lesser extent) by the English 1975 Act deserve to be challenged.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It took 35 years for Ireland to follow England and Wales in allowing family provision claims by 
applicants other than spouses and children of the deceased.  But although the Irish 2010 Act and the 
English 1975 Act clearly take different approaches when defining a relevant cohabiting couple for 
the purposes of their succession provisions, the significantly varying duration requirements and 
provisions governing those in subsisting marriages may well turn out to be the most crucial causes 
of discrepancy as regards eligibility between the two Acts.  While it will be difficult definitively to 
analyse the definition of a “qualified” cohabitant contained in the new Irish legislation until a 
significant number of judgments are issued on the point, it seems that the 2010 Act in substance 
reflects much of what has been said in the English case law concerning cohabitants bringing a claim 
against their deceased partners’ estates.   
 Of course, the fact that the two pieces of legislation produce similar results does not mean 
that those results are correct.  This article has suggested that both place a significant and undue 
amount of weight on the presence or absence of sexual intimacy, even if the English Act 
counterbalances this to some extent with a “dependants” category that could soon be the subject of 
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further reform.  Whatever the uncertainties and empirical background, there are other relationships 
worthy of protection via succession law whose parties are less likely to fall within the relevant 
definitions of “cohabitant” under either Act, and it is not clear why a sexual relationship should be a 
pre-requisite for eligibility (even if it ultimately becomes relevant when a given claim is evaluated).  
Both England and Wales and Ireland should follow the lead taken by the Australian states and 
territories in recognising a wider range of non-conjugal relationships in their family provision laws.  
It is particularly disappointing that Ireland failed to do so given that reforms to its succession law 
were undertaken so recently.  Until it facilitates a wider range of family provision claims, the Irish 
state could be accused of taking an unhealthily strong interest in the sex lives (or lack thereof) of its 
citizens via the succession provisions of the 2010 Act. 
